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WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHERS?:  
ENACTING A CORPORATE OBSERVING BOARD 
TO INCREASE CONSIDERATION OF 
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS 
Zachary Needle* 
 
Modern U.S. corporate law has compelled corporate directors to make 
decisions that maximize share value regardless of the effect they have on the 
firm’s other stakeholders, like employees, creditors, and suppliers.  While 
shareholder primacy is the norm in the United States, there are competing 
theories, mainly the stakeholder model, that have cognizable influence not 
only in the United States but also in foreign states. 
Both theories have their drawbacks, but the “short-termism” associated 
with shareholder primacy can damage a firm’s health.  Directors make 
decisions that benefit the firm in the short term but often wipe out long-term 
value. 
This Note proposes a novel solution to this problem that looks to minimally 
disrupt current practices while also exacting considerable changes to the 
decision-making process for directors:  promulgating a federal rule through 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to create an “observing board,” 
which will represent specific stakeholder groups. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Verizon was rallying on the back of a healthy economy.  Its stock 
price had risen from $46.29 in March,1 to $54.94 by October 1,2 amounting 
to an 18.7 percent increase in a little over six months.  Verizon’s directors 
also announced that they would be increasing the quarterly dividend by 2.1 
percent, to 60.25 cents per share.3  In light of this financial success, it must 
have been surprising for 44,000 Verizon employees when they heard they 
had been laid off.4  After the layoffs, while many workers scrambled to find 
employment before the holiday season, shareholders of Verizon saw the 
company’s stock price rise to $60.30.5 
 
 1. See Verizon Communications Inc. (VZ):  NYSE–Nasdaq Real Time Price, YAHOO! 
FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/VZ [https://perma.cc/2GEP-YMGC] (last visited Oct. 3 
2, 2020) (click the chart tab, then look at a five-year chart)  
 2. See id. 
 3. See Lawrence C. Strauss, Verizon Announces Another Dividend Hike, BARRON’S 
(Sept. 6, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/verizon-announces-another-
dividend-hike-1536267141?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/DB58-D8U3]. 
 4. See Jeb Su, Verizon Lays Off 44,000, Transfers 2,500 More IT Jobs to Indian 
Outsourcer Infosys, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/ 
10/05/verizon-lays-off-44000-transfers-2500-more-it-jobs-to-indian-outsourcer-
infosys/#cb1da5e46f59 [https://perma.cc/U4YE-K5U4].  While Verizon is a big corporation, 
the combined layoffs and transfers still affected over 30 percent of its workforce. Id. 
 5. See Verizon Communications Inc. (VZ):  NYSE–Nasdaq Real Time Price, supra note 
1. 
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Sequences such as the above are not unique in the current U.S. corporate 
climate.6  As a result, the support for corporate governance reform has grown 
in recent years.  Politicians like Elizabeth Warren7 and Bernie Sanders,8 chief 
executives like Jeff Bezos and Jamie Dimon,9 and prominent investment 
corporations like BlackRock10 and Vanguard11 have reignited debate 
regarding whether a corporation should address its nonshareholder 
constituencies.  The traditional norm in U.S. corporate law has been that the 
board of directors owes a duty of loyalty to the shareholders.12  This duty is 
often framed as maximizing shareholder wealth.13 
Critics of “shareholder primacy,” however, have posited a different 
argument that insists the board of directors should consider the interests of 
all stakeholders of the firm:  employees, creditors, suppliers, and the nearby 
community, among others.14  These advocates contend that many 
fundamental assumptions of shareholder primacy are rooted in tenuous 
 
 6. See generally Jill Cornfile & Annie Nova, Unemployment Just Hit 14.7% yet the 
Market Is Way up.  Please Explain!, CNBC (May 8, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/ 
08/unemployment-is-higher-than-ever-so-why-is-the-market-rallying.html [https://perma.cc/ 
64SF-THKV]. 
 7. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (sponsored by Senator 
Elizabeth Warren). 
 8. See generally Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan, BERNIE, 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy [https://perma.cc/ 
9NCG-6NWK] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
 9. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An 
Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-
corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/UMS8-
BSZK] (committing to investing in employees, dealing fairly and ethically with suppliers, and 
supporting the surrounding communities as means of emphasizing all stakeholders).  Jeff 
Bezos and Jamie Dimon, along with 179 other CEOs, are signatories. See Statement on the 
Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 2019), https://opportunity. 
businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-
Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/35TB-X45G]. 
 10. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOS:  A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter 
[https://perma.cc/DH2B-PX3N] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (declaring the importance of 
investing in corporations that benefit all their stakeholders and encouraging companies to put 
more of an emphasis on their “critical stakeholders”). 
 11. VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP:  2018 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2018), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/2018_ 
investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LDX-4TUG]. 
 12. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N2T-ZMUX]. 
 13. See Henry Hansmaan & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 450, 468 (2001). 
 14. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); see also ROBERT PHILLIPS, STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS 135–52 (2003); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder 
Value”:  Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 
59, 61 (2010). 
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premises15 and that corporate models involving all stakeholders offer 
additional benefits to firms.16 
In theory, the recent proclamations of distinguished executives and 
institutional investors are a welcome sign for the adoption of a more 
stakeholder-centric governance model.17  However, these statements are 
likely just lip service to placate the general public.18  Ultimately, it is the 
firm’s shareholders who to vote to appoint directors.19  Likewise, only 
shareholders have a direct right to sue directors.20  That being the case, there 
is no real incentive for directors to act at the behest of other stakeholders.21  
This is particularly concerning since this lack of incentive can lead to myopic 
decisions that harm the firm in the long run.  This is known as “short-
termism.” 
Part I of this Note will explore the shareholder primacy and stakeholder 
models.  It will first look at how shareholder primacy became entrenched as 
the norm in U.S. corporate law.  The Note will initially discuss some of the 
benefits and drawbacks of this model.  Then, it will conduct a similar 
discussion for the stakeholder model by analyzing some circumstances where 
a firm takes all stakeholders into account and addresses the benefits and 
disadvantages of this approach. 
Part II will observe the issues that arise when firms follow the shareholder 
primacy model.  Here, the Note will focus on short-termism and its adverse 
effects on corporate health.  This part will also examine the link between a 
stakeholder approach and “long-termism.” 
Finally, Part III will propose promulgating a new Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) rule that requires companies of a certain size to create a 
three-person “observing board,” consisting of employee, creditor, and 
minority shareholder representatives.  This solution allows for the board of 
directors to focus its business strategies on benefitting all stakeholders, not 
just shareholders. 
 
 15. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94 (2002). 
 16. See, e.g., Caroline Flammer & Aleksandra Kacperczyk, The Impact of Stakeholder 
Orientation on Innovation:  Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 62 MGMT. SCI. 1982, 1984–
86 (2016); Jordi Surroca, Josep A. Tribó & Sandra Waddock, Corporate Responsibility and 
Financial Performance:  The Role of Intangible Resources, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 463, 466–
72 (2010). 
 17. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 10; Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a 
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ supra note 9. 
 18. See, e.g., Jordan Weissmann, America’s Most Powerful CEOs Say They No Longer 
Only Care About Shareholder Value.  Here’s How They Can Prove It., SLATE (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://slate.com/business/2019/08/ceos-shareholder-value-investors-business-
roundtable.html [https://perma.cc/CFR9-Z8FY]. 
 19. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020); see also Seidman & Assocs. v. G.A. Fin., 
Inc., 837 A.2d 21, 26 (Del. Ch. 2003).  See generally Leo E. Strine Jr., Making It Easier for 
Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2014). 
 20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327; Strine Jr., supra note 19, at 238. 
 21. See generally Strine Jr., supra note 19. 
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I.  COMPETING MODELS:  WHO DOES THE CORPORATION CARE ABOUT? 
Debate has raged for almost a century over the purpose of a corporation.22  
One’s stance in this debate, as well as one’s notion as to which interested 
parties a corporation should prioritize, inevitably depends on which of the 
two primary schools of thought one adopts.  Those who side with Professor 
Adolf Berle, an early advocate of shareholder primacy, insist that the 
corporation should only work to maximize the wealth of its shareholders.23  
Alternatively, those who side with Professor E. Merrick Dodd maintain that 
the corporation should concern itself with all the firm’s major stakeholder 
groups.24 
Part I.A provides a brief overview of the function of a corporation’s board 
of directors, the board that makes and approves major decisions affecting 
stakeholders.  Part I.B then details the shareholder primacy model.  Part I.C 
details the stakeholder theory. 
A.  The Board of Directors 
Generally, corporations elect a board of directors to manage their business 
and affairs.25  The rules guiding board composition, powers, and duties are 
governed by state law, which means there can be variations depending on the 
firm’s place of incorporation.26  Due to its corporation-friendly laws, most 
companies incorporate in Delaware, making its corporate law highly 
significant in any business-related matter.27  Thus, this Note will frequently 
refer to Delaware law for examples and analyses. 
 
 22. Compare Adolf A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (1931), with E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 23. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s 
Corporatist Origins:  Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 147–49 
(2008). 
 24. See A. A. Sommer Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?:  The Berle-Dodd 
Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 54 (1991). 
 25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
 26. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). 
 27. This Note will primarily focus on Delaware law as it is the most significant and 
impactful state in terms of corporate law. See Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-Annual-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ6T-WUUS] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (noting that 67.2 
percent of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware and, as of 2018, 1.4 million 
legal entities are incorporated in the state).  Its judges are considered top-notch and many other 
states adopt similar approaches to Delaware’s corporate law. See Alana Semuels, The Tiny 
State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-governance/502487 [https://perma.cc/ 
5UNU-JXEB] (quoting Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III as saying that “Delaware common 
law is really the national law of corporations for the most part”).  Delaware has probably won 
the race to the top (or the race to the bottom, depending on what aspect of corporate law one 
discusses) when it comes to corporate law and incorporations.  A discussion as to to the 
reasons why is outside the scope of this Note, but a considerable amount of literature has been 
published on the subject. See, e.g., Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware:  The 
Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 382–84 (2005); Marcel 
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A board’s composition and election process are salient drivers of corporate 
governance and must be addressed in turn.  The number of directors on a 
company’s board will vary depending on the corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation and bylaws.28  These directors are elected by the shareholders 
as provided in the company’s certificate of incorporation.29  While 
arrangements may differ, each shareholder is typically entitled to one vote 
for every share owned.30  Term lengths of directors also vary depending on 
the certificate of incorporation and bylaws.  A nonstaggered board of 
directors will sit for election annually.31  However, if the board is staggered, 
directors often sit for three-year terms.32  Staggered boards have begun to fall 
out of favor, however.33 
The board of directors owes many duties to the shareholders of the 
corporation it represents.34  Primarily, this stems from the reality that the 
property it manages is not its own but that of the shareholders.  The board 
thus owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.35  However, directors’ duties 
depend on the current financial state of the company.36  Generally, the duties 
include a duty to govern the business and affairs of the corporation,37 “an 
unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act 
in the best interests of its shareholders,”38 and a duty to fully disclose all 
material information.39  It is important to note that no state, including 
Delaware, imposes a rigid duty to maximize shareholder value.40  Even so, 
 
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
679, 684 (2002) (arguing that states no longer compete and that Delaware has a monopoly). 
 28. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b). 
 29. See id. § 212(a). 
 30. See id.  Often, however, a corporation will have different classes of stock that allow 
for more than a single vote per share. See Class of Shares, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/class.asp [https://perma.cc/9FY7-LWEA] (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2020). 
 31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211. 
 32. See id. § 141(d). 
 33. See generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 
Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013). 
 34. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 35. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
 36. More specifically, the duties of directors can differ when the company is solvent 
versus insolvent, as well as during takeover attempts. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), with Kidde Indus., Inc. v. Weaver Corp., 593 
A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
 37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).  This is one of the most fundamental duties a director has. 
See generally Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993). 
 38. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360.  This includes all shareholders, not just those who 
specifically elected the director if the corporate bylaws call for a split voting structure. See 
generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 39. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Stroud v. Grace, 606 
A.2d 75, 84–85 (Del. 1992). 
 40. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150; Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 
179–81. 
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most corporations pursue shareholder wealth maximization in harmony with 
the shareholder primacy model. 
B.  The Shareholder Primacy Model 
The shareholder primacy model is the dominant theory of corporate 
governance in the United States.41  Although not recognized as law, it is a 
clearly established norm that the board of directors must maximize the wealth 
of the firm’s shareholders.42 
Part I.B.1 discusses the history and current state of the model.  Part I.B.2 
then analyzes the benefits to an approach that utilizes shareholder primacy.  
This part will also introduce the drawbacks of this model, although a more 
comprehensive discussion will be saved for Part II of this Note. 
1.  The History and Case Law of Shareholder Primacy 
The debate surrounding corporate purpose has its origins in a series of 
articles written by Professors Berle and Dodd in the 1930s.43  Berle, in his 
article Corporate Powers as Powers of Trust, expounded his trust theory of 
corporations.44  He posited that managers were trustees of the shareholders 
and, therefore, should only use their corporate powers for the benefit of the 
shareholder.45  He further stated that there was a limitation to this corporate 
power, and when managers used their power to the “detriment” of the 
shareholder, the judiciary should step in.46  In his 1970 essay for the New 
York Times, Milton Friedman introduced shareholder primacy to the wider 
public.47  In the essay, he argued that “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits.”48  Since that essay, shareholder primacy has 
become more entrenched in U.S. corporate law.49 
Social and political changes in the 1980s further popularized the 
shareholder primacy model.  The deregulatory environment that President 
Ronald Reagan fashioned helped catalyze shareholder wealth 
maximization.50  Likewise, the corporate takeover atmosphere of the 1980s 
 
 41. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 
1953–54 (2018). 
 42. See id. at 1956–60. 
 43. Compare Berle Jr., supra note 22, with Dodd Jr., supra note 22. 
 44. See Berle Jr., supra note 22, at 1074. 
 45. See id. at 1049. 
 46. See id.  For an in-depth look at the origins of Berle’s positions, see, for example, 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23. 
 47. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 1. 
 48. See id. at 6. 
 49. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 440–41; Amir N. Licht, The 
Maximands of Corporate Governance:  A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 649, 650–52 (2004); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. 
L. 277, 277–79 (1998). 
 50. David J. Berger, In Search of Lost Time:  What If Delaware Had Not Adopted 
Shareholder Primacy?, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES:  IS THE LAW 
KEEPING UP? 48, 49–50 (2019). 
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cultivated a corporate environment ripe for the implementation of the 
shareholder primacy norm.51  It became so prevalent in corporate law that in 
the early twenty-first century, Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman declared there was no serious competitor to the shareholder model 
and that its “triumph . . . over its principal competitors is now assured.”52  
However, the 2007–2008 financial crisis reinvigorated attacks on the 
shareholder primacy model from scholars and economists.53  Even so, the 
model is still the established norm in corporate law.54 
The case law that established shareholder primacy as the norm in Delaware 
law sprouted in the early twentieth-century, then took root in two seminal 
cases in the 1980s.55  Yet, shareholder primacy’s rise began not in Delaware 
but rather in Michigan, with Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.56  There, the Michigan 
Supreme Court stated, “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end.”57  It was not until over sixty years later that 
Delaware, through a series of decisions, adopted a similar view.58  First in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,59 the Delaware Supreme Court 
considered whether a board of directors facing a takeover bid could consider 
the interests of groups other than the shareholders.60  The court reiterated the 
“basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”61  One year later, in the 
formative Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,62 the same court 
addressed whether the board of directors could consider constituencies other 
than shareholders.63  The court concluded that a board can consider various 
constituencies so long as there are “rationally related benefits” for the 
shareholders.64  The court made it clear that directors of a corporation need 
to strive to maximize the wealth of shareholders.65  The board can consider 
 
 51. See id. at 50. 
 52. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 468. 
 53. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653 (2010). 
 54. See Rhee, supra note 41, at 1956–60. 
 55. See infra note 58. 
 56. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 57. See id. at 684.  The court uses the term “stockholder,” which is interchangeable with 
“shareholder,” the term that this Note prefers. 
 58. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. Ch. 2010).  See generally Leo E. Strine Jr., 
The Dangers of Denial:  The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and 
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 761, 768–81 (2015). 
 59. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 60. See id. at 949. 
 61. Id. at 955; see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  Note that 
“stockholder” is synonymous with “shareholder.” 
 62. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 63. Id. at 176. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id.; see also Strine Jr., supra note 58, at 769–73. 
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nonshareholder interests only if they can be justified as benefiting the 
shareholders as well.66 
This general proposition was recently validated in eBay Domestic 
Holdings v. Newmark,67 where the Delaware Court of Chancery started by 
restating the general principle that directors are fiduciaries of the 
corporation’s shareholders.68  It went on to state that, since the corporation 
was for-profit, “directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that 
accompany that form.  Those standards include acting to promote the value 
of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”69  Thus, the court 
concluded by rejecting a corporate policy that openly admitted to not seeking 
to maximize the economic value of the firm for its shareholders.70  These 
cases demonstrate how embedded shareholder primacy has become in 
Delaware corporate law, which in turn governs the structure of a large portion 
of U.S. businesses.71  Again, it is important to note that there is no statutory 
provision in Delaware mandating shareholder wealth maximization.72 
2.  Benefits of Utilizing a Shareholder Primacy Model 
Several theoretical benefits derive from shareholder primacy, which 
helped champion the model.  The reduction of agency costs is one of the chief 
advantages of the model.73  Many argue that directors are agents and act on 
behalf of the principals, the shareholders.74  Directors are entrusted with 
authority by the corporation and its shareholders, and they exercise this 
authority for a fee.75  This typically indicates an agency relationship.76  When 
the principal can better monitor the agent, there is a strong likelihood that 
agency costs are diminished.77  It is straightforward to manage and monitor 
the agent when the sole measurement is stock price.78  The agent cannot mask 
self-motivated decisions.79  The duty to maximize shareholder wealth 
compels the agent to act in the best interest of the principal, thereby reducing 
agency and monitoring costs. 
 
 66. See id. at 771. 
 67. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 68. See id. at 26. 
 69. See id. at 34. 
 70. See id. at 35. 
 71. See Annual Report Statistics, supra note 27. 
 72. See Rhee, supra note 41, at 1956–60. 
 73. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489 (2013); Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 74. See Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 565.  See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
73. 
 75. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top:  
The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 436 (1985). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 503. 
 78. See Stout, supra note 15, at 1200. 
 79. See id. 
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The incentive programs many corporations use reinforce the emphasis on 
reducing agency costs.80  The salaries and bonuses paid out to managers are 
often tied directly to share price.81  Aligning the interests of the shareholders 
(principals) and the directors (agents) plays into the theme of reducing 
agency costs.82 
This potential reduction in costs can then lead to maximization of the 
company’s overall value.83  Some argue that increases in value can, in turn, 
lead to greater societal wealth.84  As the residual claimants to the 
corporation’s assets and earnings,85 shareholders arguably have the strongest 
incentive to maximize the corporation’s productivity and thus, overall 
value.86 
There are also potential drawbacks to shareholder primacy.  The most 
relevant for purposes of this Note is the pervasion of short-termism in 
corporate decision-making.  When the shareholders’ interests are paramount, 
directors may be incentivized to make decisions that increase share value in 
the short term while creating a long-term detriment to the company.87  This 
Note will expand on this issue in Part II.88  A secondary, yet also significant 
difficulty of the shareholder primacy model is that it threatens creditor 
welfare.89  The worry stems from the fact that, since interests of shareholders 
and creditors can conflict, decision makers are incentivized to externalize 
risk onto the firm’s creditors when shareholders are prioritized.90  For 
example, when a firm pays out dividends or borrows more, shareholders’ 
expected returns increase while the chances of repayment for creditors 
decreases.91 
 
 80. See STEEN THOMSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  MECHANISMS 
AND SYSTEMS 175 (2008). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 173–75. 
 83. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 503. 
 84. See id. 
 85. A residual claimant is the person who has the remaining claim on a company’s net 
cash flows. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983). 
 86. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 788 (1972); Mark E. Van Der Weide, 
Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 57 (1996). 
 87. See David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate 
Purpose, 74 BUS. L.J. 659, 667 (2019). 
 88. See infra Part II. 
 89. See Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
2003, 2011 (2013). 
 90. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1928 (2013). 
 91. See Stout, supra note 89, at 2011. 
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C.  The Stakeholder Model 
The primary competing view to shareholder primacy is one that 
emphasizes all the stakeholders of a corporation, not just the shareholders.92  
While rarely utilized by American corporations, the theory still has 
significant support from scholars.93  Further, many foreign countries have 
corporate governance laws that reflect these principles.94  Recent U.S. 
corporate law innovations also demonstrate the theory’s constant, yet 
shrouded, presence.95 
Part I.C.1 will examine the history of this theory in the United States as 
well as the sparse case law that veers away from strict shareholder primacy.  
Part I.C.2 will discuss benefit corporations, a newer innovation from states 
that allows a board of directors to consider actors beyond the shareholder.  
Part I.C.3 will briefly explore pertinent foreign law that utilizes a stakeholder 
approach.  Finally, Part I.C.4 will consider some of the benefits and 
drawbacks of the theory. 
1.  History and Case Law 
In contrast to Professor Berle, Professor Dodd argued that corporations 
should have “a social service as well as a profit-making function.”96  Dodd 
believed that managers should act as the trustees for the general public and 
should use their corporations to address social issues.97  Throughout the 
twentieth century, however, this view took a back seat to shareholder 
primacy.98  It eventually began to creep back into the public eye in the 1980s 
with R. Edward Freeman’s Strategic Management:  A Stakeholder 
Approach.99  The adoption of constituency statutes, which allow directors to 
consider other constituency groups, by some states in the late 1980s and early 
1990s rekindled the debate between shareholder and stakeholder models of 
corporate governance.100 
There is some case law suggesting that directors must consider 
nonshareholder over shareholder interests at times.  Unocal, for example, 
indicated that a board of directors could take into account factors unrelated 
to maximizing shareholder wealth when making decisions in the hostile 
takeover realm.101  This decision granted the board of directors great 
 
 92. See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:  A STAKEHOLDER 
APPROACH (2010). 
 93. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:  HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
 94. See infra notes 122–37 
 95. See infra notes 109–20. 
 96. Dodd Jr., supra note 22, at 1148. 
 97. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 125. 
 98. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 99. See generally Licht, supra note 49, at 721–22 (discussing Freeman’s “landmark” 
book). 
 100. See id. at 705. 
 101. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that 
one factor a board can consider is “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., 
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flexibility in defending against takeover attempts.  Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.102 is another Delaware Supreme Court 
decision where the court noted that a board of directors “is not under any per 
se duty to maximize shareholder value.”103  Although later decisions have 
receded from this position,104 these rulings stand as examples that confer 
power on directors to do things that do not directly increase shareholder 
wealth. 
2.  Benefit Corporations 
Kickstarter is a global crowdfunding site whose mission is to “help bring 
creative projects to life.”105  Since its inception in 2009, over eighteen million 
people have pledged a collective $5.2 billion to Kickstarter projects.106  
Despite these impressive numbers, Kickstarter does not exist solely to 
generate revenue for its shareholders.  Instead, even though it is a for-profit 
corporation, Kickstarter’s primary purpose is bringing projects to life.107  It 
has been permitted to seek these goals since its reincorporation as a benefit 
corporation in 2015.108 
A benefit corporation is an entity created under state law109 that allows for 
a corporation to pursue goals beyond maximizing shareholder wealth.110  
Benefit corporations serve as a reminder that, while shareholder primacy is 
the norm, states are willing to claw back at its rigidity and allow for another 
theory to emerge.111  In its charter, the benefit corporation outlines its mission 
and ethical goals, and it is then required to adhere to those objectives.112  
While still a fledgling entity structure,113 the benefit corporation has slowly 
become a more prevalent corporate form that emphasizes the collective 
stakeholders rather than just the shareholders.114 
 
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”); see also 
Strine Jr., supra note 58, at 768–69. 
 102. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 103. See id. at 1150. 
 104. See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179–80 
(Del. 1986); Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 545–48 (Del. Ch. 2015); 
eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 105. Hello, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about?ref=global-footer [https:// 
perma.cc/89LS-WLVT] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
 106. See id. 
 107. Charter:  Kickstarter Is a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER, https://www. 
kickstarter.com/charter [https://perma.cc/7ZF7-JNQ5] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
 108. See id. 
 109. As of this writing, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia recognize benefit 
corporations. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/ 
policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/T3AK-DKBD] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
 110. See David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy:  Is the Public Benefit 
Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 481–83 (2017). 
 111. See generally Berger, supra note 50. 
 112. See Yosifon, supra note 110, at 480–83. 
 113. See Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 82–
86 (2017). 
 114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2020). 
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Benefit corporations are generally created with the intention to produce a 
public benefit or benefits in a socially responsible manner.115  This is made 
possible by requiring the board of directors to balance the shareholders’ 
interests with the interests of those affected by the firm’s conduct, while also 
taking the corporation’s mission and goals into account.116  As the form is 
still new, the number of benefit corporations is diminutive as compared to 
the number of incorporated legal entities.117  However, between July 2013 
and January 2016, the number of public benefit corporations increased nearly 
twelvefold.118  This explosion demonstrates that corporations may be more 
receptive to a stakeholder-oriented approach to governance. 
While benefit corporations have increased in popularity with state 
legislatures over the last five years,119 they are constantly criticized by 
corporate law experts.120  Even so, their prevalence in state corporate 
statutory schemes highlights that legislatures believe corporate purpose can 
fall outside the shareholder primacy model.  The states that have enacted 
statutes permitting benefit corporations are a mélange of liberal-leaning and 
conservative-leaning states, indicating that partisan politics is not a factor in 
the adoption of these statutes.121  This further highlights the steady presence 
of stakeholder ideals in the United States and their emergence in the twenty-
first century. 
3.  German Law as a Comparative Case Study 
A number of foreign countries have corporate governance laws that reflect 
more of a stakeholder approach.122  Germany, in particular, places 
considerable emphasis on the employee constituency group.123  There, 
corporations are required to have two boards:  one managing board that 
functions similar to the U.S. board of directors (the Vorstand) and one 
 
 115. Id. § 362. 
 116. Id. §§ 362, 365(a). 
 117. See Dorff, supra note 113, at 84 (stating that there were approximately 1.1 million 
legal entities registered in Delaware at the end of 2014 and fewer than 300 were public benefit 
corporations). 
 118. See id. at 84–85. 
 119. See State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 109 (showing that, as of this 
writing, four states have proposed benefit corporation laws pending legislative review). 
 120. See, e.g., Sherwin D. Abrams, Decisions, Decisions:  Helping Clients Choose the 
Right Business Entity, 101 ILL. BAR J. 530, 534 (2013) (asserting that benefit corporations are 
mere marketing devices); Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, Sustainable Business, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 851, 865 (2013) (arguing that benefit corporations, in reality, may be no different than 
regular corporations but rather that they attempt to benefit under the guise of being socially 
conscious); Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 305–306 (2012).  Raz claims that most benefit corporation 
statutes provide little protections from the wants of the shareholders. Id.  The argument 
continues that if shareholders want managers to maximize profits, there are no real protections 
to stop the corporation from doing so. Id. 
 121. See State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 109. 
 122. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe—
Accountability and Convergence, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 301, 301 (2013). 
 123. See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate 
Governance:  A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 309–11 (2011). 
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supervisory board (the Aufsichtsrat).124  This supervisory council is entirely 
separate from the management board and has its own powers.125  The 
Aufsichtsrat appoints people to the Vorstand for five-year terms while also 
reviewing firm and management performance over the course of the year.126  
The Vorstand, on the other hand, makes the day-to-day firm decisions but 
ultimately reports to the Aufsichtsrat.127  The Aufsichtsrat also has the right 
to examine the books, records, and assets of the corporation.128  Further, the 
Aufsichtsrat must approve the annual financial statements of the company.129  
These powers allow the Aufsichtsrat to choose the firm’s decision makers.  It 
also allows them to tightly monitor the Vorstand members.130  In turn, this 
should reduce transaction costs due to less information asymmetry.  It should 
also lead to a reduction in agency costs since the Vorstand is more closely 
monitored.131 
The composition of the Aufsichtsrat is governed by both Germany’s Stock 
Corporation Act132 and its Codetermination Act of 1976.133  The Stock 
Corporation Act requires the Aufsichtsrat to have at a minimum three 
members and a maximum that depends on the company’s share capital.134  
For those companies that meet the requirements of the Codetermination Act, 
the Stock Corporation Act requires the Aufsichtsrat be composed of a certain 
number of employee representatives.135  The Codetermination Act provides 
for half the board to be employee representatives.136  Having employees on 
a board with authority serves a dual function by allowing employees to better 
 
 124. See id. at 359. 
 125. See Jun Zhao, Comparative Study of U.S. and German Corporate Governance:  
Suggestions on the Relationship Between Independent Directors and the Supervisory Board 
of Listed Companies in China, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 495, 500 (2010). 
 126. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and 
the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1941–42 (1993). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL I at 1089, last 
amended by Gesetz [G], July 17, 2017, BGBL I at 2446, § 111 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_aktg/englisch_aktg.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC2L-5NXL]. 
 129. See id. § 172.  This approval can be bypassed if the Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand agree 
that the statements are to be approved at the shareholder’s meeting. Id. 
 130. See Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations:  A Comparative 
Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 555, 559–
61 (2000). 
 131. See generally id. 
 132. See Stock Corporation Act, §§ 95–96 (Ger.).  The Aktiengesetz is the German Stock 
Corporation Act and regulates the stock corporation or the Aktiengesellschaft.  The 
Aktiengesellschaft is the German counterpart to the U.S. corporation. See Butler, supra note 
130, at 555, 561 (2000). 
 133. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Act], May 4, 1976, BGBL I at 
1153, last amended by Gesetz [G], Apr. 24, 2015, BGBL I at 642, art. 7 (Ger.).  See generally 
Mark Roe, German Codetermination and the German Securities Market, 1998 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 167. 
 134. See Stock Corporation Act, § 95 (Ger.). 
 135. See id. § 96(1). 
 136. These employee representatives are split into three groups:  workers’ representatives, 
union representatives, and managerial employees’ representatives. See Hans-Joachim Mertens 
& Erich Schanze, The German Codetermination Act of 1976, 2 J. COMPAR. CORP. L. & SEC. 
REGUL. 75, 78 (1979). 
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monitor management while also forcing the managing board to be cognizant 
of the needs of the labor force.137 
4.  Benefits and Drawbacks of Stakeholder Theory 
The number and substance of academic arguments supporting stakeholder 
models of corporate governance have increased considerably in recent 
years.138  It is important to note that there is not one general stakeholder 
theory but rather a collection of variants that attempt to achieve the same 
goal—to consider nonshareholders in corporate decision-making—through 
different means.139 
Whereas shareholder primacy focuses solely on efficiency, stakeholder 
models point to other values while still paying attention to efficiency.140  For 
example, trust is a vital element of the theory.141  Some scholars argue that 
when a corporation secures the trust of its primary stakeholders, the firm 
value increases.142  When a corporation balances the interest of multiple 
constituencies, it appears moral and thoughtful.143  This allows stakeholders 
to develop greater trust for the corporation and strengthens the firm’s 
reputation.144  When a firm rewards its stakeholders, it is more likely they 
will work amicably with the company.145  Further, trust can reduce costs.146  
When there is trust, monitoring costs decrease as firm decision makers do not 
need to be watched as closely.147  Likewise, it should make the board’s 
monitoring of some stakeholder groups more efficient.148 
Some theorists also argue that stakeholder theories afford a firm’s many 
constituencies protection of their property rights.149  The rationale is that 
 
 137. See Tom C. Hodge, The Treatment of Employees as Stakeholders in the European 
Union:  Current and Future Trends, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 91, 123 (2010); Zhao, 
supra note 125, at 500. 
 138. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248 (1999); Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New 
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4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 409, 413 (1994). 
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RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 249, 260 (2010). 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
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 145. See, e.g., John Plender, Giving People a Stake in the Future, 31 LONG RANGE PLAN. 
211, 215 (1998). 
 146. See Keay, supra note 140, at 268–69. 
 147. See R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding:  A 
Trust-Generating Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2003). 
 148. See id. at 1120. 
 149. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman & Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory:  A Libertarian 
Defense, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 331, 338 (2002). 
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these stakeholders have contributed to the capital of the corporation and thus 
have some entitlements.150  Many stakeholders make specific investments in 
a corporation, much like shareholders do.151  However, the argument against 
this is that contracts and regulations generally protect stakeholders.  
Creditors, specifically large banks, can enter into detailed contracts that 
provide protections.152  Similarly, employees and consumers are protected 
by regulatory bodies.153  Thus, arguably, there is no reason to give these 
stakeholders special treatment.154  Stakeholder theorists retort by arguing 
there is constantly an inequality in bargaining power due to informational 
asymmetry.155 
Critics take up a number of other issues with stakeholder theories.  One of 
the primary and earliest criticisms of stakeholder theories is the difficulty in 
defining who the stakeholders of a corporation are.156  Edward Freeman 
concluded that stakeholders were “any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by . . . the organization’s objectives.”157  This expansive view of 
the stakeholder includes governments, environmental groups, and even 
terrorists.158  This broad approach highlights how difficult it can be for the 
board of directors to truly delineate which groups are stakeholders.159  Some 
theorists have attempted to distinguish those who influence the firm, such as 
a terrorist group perhaps, and those who have legitimately invested in the 
firm.160  Others have differentiated between primary and secondary 
stakeholders.161  The ambiguity of which groups constitute stakeholders 
makes it more difficult to implement a stakeholder model. 
Another criticism of the model is that even if one were to delineate 
between stakeholder groups, managers and directors would have difficulty 
balancing interests.162  After directors have established who the stakeholders 
 
 150. See Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1156, 1171 (1993). 
 151. See, e.g., Keay, supra note 140, at 266 (discussing how employees may undergo 
specialized training or how suppliers may acquire specialized machinery to benefit the 
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 152. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 89, at 2011; Van Der Weide, supra note 86, at 45–47. 
 153. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of 
Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 202–03 (1935). 
 154. See Keay, supra note 140, at 292. 
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Salience:  Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853, 
862 (1997). 
 157. See FREEMAN, supra note 92, at 46. 
 158. See id. at 53; see also Keay, supra note 140, at 274. 
 159. See Keay, supra note 140, at 274. 
 160. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:  
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 65, 86 (1995). 
 161. Primary stakeholders are those with a formal, official, or contractual relationship with 
the firm, whereas secondary stakeholders do not have these intimate connections. See Keay, 
supra note 140, at 274. 
 162. See R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic 
Management, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 189, 194 (M. Hitt 
et al. eds., 2001). 
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are, they then need to assess and balance the concerns of each group.163  Even 
within specific constituencies, there may be divergent interests.164  The 
heterogeneity of stakeholder groups makes it nearly impossible for directors 
to focus in on a single objective.165  Further, this balancing problem provides 
a prime opportunity for directors to engage in opportunism.166 
These issues speak to another criticism of the model:  that it is 
unworkable.167  When compared to the shareholder primacy model, the 
stakeholder model is difficult to implement and requires too much analysis 
of various groups.168  The model seemingly is too imprecise and takes too 
much time to be truly viable.169 
While it has its problems, the stakeholder approach has remained 
influential and continues to garner support because it addresses important 
concerns for corporations:  ensuring that the firm’s decision makers consider 
all stakeholders.  It also compels the board to think about the firm’s long-
term health and avoids the pernicious effects of short-term business 
decisions. 
II.  SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY’S BIG ISSUE:  SHORT-TERMISM 
While it is the corporate norm in the United States, the shareholder 
primacy model has serious shortcomings.  One of the most significant 
shortcomings is the short-termism it often causes.  Short-termism is the 
notion that decision makers are shortsighted because they focus on short-term 
results at the expense of long-term profitability and company value.170  This 
can become rampant when institutional investors like hedge funds hold large 
positions in the company.171 
Part II.A will discuss who these investors are and their motivations for 
pursuing short-term strategies.  Part II.B will examine other factors that often 
play a role in short-termism.  Part II.C will survey typical short-term tactics 
and why they can be deleterious to a firm’s health.  Finally, Part II.D will 
assess how the stakeholder model induces long-termism and why this is 
better for a company’s health than short-termism. 
 
 163. See Keay, supra note 140, at 277. 
 164. See Steve Letza et al., Shareholding Versus Stakeholding:  A Critical Review of 
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 168. See Keay, supra note 140, at 290. 
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A.  Who Are Short-Term Investors and What Motivates Them? 
When the purpose of a corporation is maximizing shareholder wealth and 
not benefiting all stakeholders, directors often introduce proposals that 
benefit the firm in the short term while hurting it in the long term.  Short-
termism is the notion that decision makers act shortsightedly by focusing on 
short-term results at the expense of long-term profitability and company 
value.172  Many scholars argue that short-termism is inauspicious because, in 
adopting short-term strategies to pump up share price, the firm sacrifices 
long-term health.173 
Typically, investors with short-term views are hedge and mutual funds.174  
Actively managed hedge and mutual funds have clients paying high fees, 
expecting high rates of return on their investments.175  Fund managers who 
are judged on their performance over four quarters are likely to support 
corporate management strategies that increase stock price in the short 
term.176  These fund managers can then turn around and sell those positions.  
Thus, it is not surprising many mutual funds have a yearly turnover of 100 
percent or more of their equity holdings.177  Likewise, many hedge funds 
hold their equity shares for less than two years.178  This greatly differs from 
the majority of investors who invest for the long term.179  Over fifty million 
households are retail investors and around 54 percent of U.S. households own 
stocks.180  These investors usually invest as a means to fund retirement or 
education, goals that require a long-term investment strategy.181  So, in 
reality, only a select few emphasize the short term, yet these are the 
institutional investors with meaningful clout.182 
The percentage of U.S. public equities managed by institutional investors 
has risen from around 7 to 8 percent of market capitalization in the 1950s to 
around 67 percent in 2010.183  In the largest U.S. corporations, institutional 
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investors owned, in the aggregate, 73 percent of the outstanding equity.184  
These institutional investors include pension funds, mutual funds, exchange 
traded funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds.  It is important to note 
that these investors vary considerably, including in their organizational 
structures, regulatory requirements, and investment strategies.185  One result 
of the significant institutional ownership equity is an increase in shareholder 
engagement from companies.186  While this can be seen as a positive,187 it 
can also lead to undesirable results.188  Institutional investors that hold large 
stakes in corporations can play an “activist” role and dictate to directors 
exactly what they are looking for; by doing so, they can exercise considerable 
influence over the firm.189  If a fund manager has the resources, the manager 
can initiate a proxy contest,190 instigate a publicity campaign against the 
board,191 or even look at takeover options if dissatisfied with management.192  
Thus, larger institutional investors, through various strategies, can often 
compel a board of directors to adopt corporate strategies that mirror their 
funds’ strategies.  These fund strategies are often geared toward pumping up 
share value in the short term at the expense of long-term firm health.193  
Therefore, it is typical for these institutional investors to look for short-term 
profits. 
B.  Other Factors Contributing to Short-Termism 
In addition to the pressures from activist funds, CEOs often feel pressure 
to meet short-term expectations from other external sources.  Quarterly 
reporting is a more recent phenomenon that many believe is linked to short-
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 186. See Holly Gregory et al., Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Business Law 
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65 BUS. LAW. 107, 112 (2009). 
 187. See Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom Door:  A Transatlantic 
Overview of Director-Institutional Investor Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L. & 
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termism.194  The SEC has required quarterly reporting, in the shape of a 10-
Q submission, from public companies since the 1970s.195  These reports have 
become a core tool used by analysts to value a company.196  Often when a 
company does not meet analyst expectations, share price tumbles.  Therefore, 
it is common for companies to use questionable accounting techniques197 or 
other means to artificially inflate the company’s 10-Q.198  These techniques, 
like share buybacks or minimization expenses for employee salaries and 
benefits, can damage a firm’s long-term health.199 
Executive compensation is another external force that can compel short-
termism.  It is normal for a CEO and other executives to have a large part of 
their compensation tied to the company’s performance.200  Often the metrics 
that compensation is tied to encourage short-term strategies and risk-taking 
over the long term.201  CEOs and other managers will often turn to layoffs, 
decreases in research and development, and changes to accounting practices 
to buoy the firm’s short-term financial position.202  These all have negative 
long-term effects for the health of a business. 
C.  Short-Term Tactics and Why They Hurt the Firm 
The board of directors will use various strategies to pump up short-term 
share value.203  Issuing dividends and repurchasing outstanding shares are 
two methods companies will often incorporate.  In 2014, the volume of stock 
buybacks reached $550 billion.204  While these buybacks can be a logical 
way for companies to use surplus cash, they simultaneously reduce 
opportunities to invest in innovation, human capital, or other areas that may 
help the firm in the long term.  The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act205 is a prime 
example of companies lobbying for short-term schemes to the detriment of 
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long-term health.  The Act cut the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 
percent.206  President Donald Trump believed this reduced rate would 
increase corporations’ cash surpluses leading to more jobs, contributions to 
employees, and contributions to the rest of the country.207  Instead, corporate 
directors primarily used this cash influx to buy back outstanding shares, 
inflating stock prices and, in turn, increasing executive compensation.208 
Management and boards also often engage in “earnings management.”209  
This involves decision makers delaying favorable transactions or hastening 
transactions in order to prop up accounting results for quarterly reports.210  
Regardless of why directors do this,211 earnings management frequently 
results in shortsighted decisions that harm the firm in the long term.212 
All these strategies can destroy long-term value in a firm.  For example, 
when a firm repurchases shares, it forgoes using some of its surplus cash on 
investments in research and development and human capital to increase share 
price.213  While many defend buybacks and point to research showing 
minimal adverse effects,214 it is more plausible that many repurchase plans 
end up harming a firm’s long-term value.215  While likely not as detrimental, 
dividends can be used in a similar manner.  They allow the corporation to 
reward its shareholders, particularly those with sizable positions, instead of 
investing in innovation.216  It should be noted that many corporations can 
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concurrently pay out dividends and invest.217  These short-term strategies 
wipe out significant long-term value from a corporation by redistributing 
cash to investors with no long-term benefit.218  Many scholars point out that 
short-termism has broader social effects and has led to financial crises in the 
past.219  They also argue that short-termism contributes to income 
inequality.220  When a company pays out a dividend to its shareholders or 
buys back stock, it is directing money to investors, who are typically 
wealthy,221 instead of its employees. 
D.  The Preferred Model:  The Stakeholder Model and Long-Termism  
Incorporating a stakeholder model would likely reduce short-termism.  
Nearly all stakeholders benefit from a firm’s long-term success.  A 
significant reason why firms engage in short-termism is to conciliate 
institutional investors.222  Compelling the board of directors to examine all 
stakeholder groups would make it more difficult for the board to implement 
short-term strategies like share repurchase plans or dividend payments.223  
Important stakeholder groups like employers, creditors, suppliers, and the 
surrounding community would all benefit from long-term strategies like 
investment in human capital, research and development, or even in increased 
employee wages.224  Even most shareholders would benefit from these 
strategies in the long term.225  Adopting a stakeholder-oriented theory of 
corporate governance would impel decision makers to take on more long-
term strategies that would not destroy firm value. 
III.  WATCHING THE WATCHERS:  THE OBSERVING BOARD 
The shareholder primacy norm causing corporations to adopt short-term 
investment strategies is a serious issue for societal welfare.226  As such, a 
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number of solutions have been proposed by politicians227 and scholars.228  
However, none of these propositions have been adopted.229  This Note 
proposes creating a second observing board that is composed of employee, 
creditor, and minority shareholder representatives.  These observers will 
have limited but defined power that should help gear the managing board (the 
regular board of directors) toward strategies that involve all stakeholders.  
First, in Part III.A, this Note will determine the best means to implement a 
solution, addressing the question of whether this is something best left for 
the corporations themselves, for the states, or for the federal government to 
implement.  Then, in Part III.B, this Note will propose a new type of board 
and analyze how it will help curtail short-termism by pressuring the 
managing board of directors to look at all stakeholders. 
A.  A Federal Solution 
In crafting the appropriate response to the issue of shareholder primacy, it 
is essential to determine the implementation process.  The type of solution 
will vary depending on who enacts it.  For example, if the corporation 
implements the solution, it will likely be more cultural than anything else.230  
If the states themselves decide to implement solutions, the answers to the 
shareholder primacy problem may vary state by state, and the courts would 
probably craft solutions through case law.231  If the SEC promulgates a new 
rule that aims to solve the issue,232 it would probably involve corporate 
disclosure, consistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis.233  Finally, if Congress enacts legislation addressing the issue, 
the legislation could mix and match disclosure and substantive remedies like 
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the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act234 and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002235 did. 
Having the SEC promulgate a new rule makes the most sense for dealing 
with this issue.236  This is a middle ground between letting corporations 
handle the issue themselves and getting Congress directly involved, and it 
also avoids an uneven patchwork of state law.  An internal approach taken 
by corporations would not lead to success.  Despite being the easiest way to 
implement any solution, the incentives of the board of directors and chief 
officers are not aligned with many of the stakeholders’ incentives.237  Their 
self-interest likely will prevent any real, meaningful change from 
occurring.238  Likewise, a state-by-state approach would be inefficient and 
extremely difficult to implement.239  Many states have already entrenched 
shareholder primacy in their common law.240  Without intervention from the 
state legislatures, changing this presumption would require considerable time 
and creative lawyering.241  It is also doubtful that state legislatures, 
independent of the courts, could enact real change.  The various state 
constituency statutes illustrate the futility of state legislatures in creating 
meaningful change in corporate law.242 
On the other end of the spectrum, using Congress to implement a solution 
would likely create ineffective laws.  While Congress has the authority to 
implement corporate governance legislation,243 it is not the most competent 
when it comes to dealing with complex governance issues.244  In contrast, 
the SEC has more specialized resources, more particularized knowledge, and 
is likely more efficient than Congress.245  The highly specialized knowledge 
of corporate law required falls outside the expertise of Congress given the 
significant experience and time required to cultivate this competence.246  
Another issue with Congress is that its members can easily be influenced.247  
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This, in turn, can water down any piece of legislation.248  There are formal 
and informal influences on congressional members.249  A final issue with 
Congress is its inefficiency, resulting in part from the number of steps 
required to pass a bill.250  A particular bill can remain in committee or in one 
of the houses for months and it can ultimately take considerable time to pass 
a bill.251  Thus by allowing Congress to craft legislation, there is a good 
chance the law looks drastically different by the time it is effective.  The 
sheer amount of time it would take to pass the bill and the various 
compromises will create a law that looks nothing like the original proposed 
act. 
Allowing the SEC to implement a rule would solve most of these issues.  
First, the SEC has authority to promulgate a rule of this sort.252  Since the 
solution proposed is disclosure-based in nature, this remains within the 
purview of the SEC.253  The SEC is the most competent agency to deal with 
this situation.  In the past, both courts and the president have deferred to SEC 
decisions on financial and corporate issues.254  Further, the SEC has a lengthy 
history of rulemaking, strengthening the argument that it is the most 
appropriate entity to implement a solution to this corporate governance 
issue.255  Compounding this is the fact that the SEC is less partisan than 
Congress.256  While SEC commissioners are nominated by the president, 
nominations are staggered so as to not allow a president to nominate every 
member during the president’s four-year term.257  Independent agencies, 
while still subject to some influences, generally are better equipped to resist 
political pressures.258  It should be noted, however, that there is a concern of 
“agency capture,” through which corporations can influence the SEC in 
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adopting less stringent rules.259  While this is a legitimate concern, the 
competence and relative independence of the SEC outweighs the fear of 
agency capture, making it the appropriate body to implement this solution. 
However, there are drawbacks to this approach.  First, agency rule 
promulgation takes time.260  The SEC would need to research the solution, 
submit a rule proposal, wait and review the comments it receives on that 
proposal, and then potentially implement those comments and go through the 
comment period again.261  Still, due to the recent swell of support concerning 
stakeholder rights, there may be greater urgency for a speedy 
implementation.  Another potential downside to having the SEC implement 
the change is the vagueness and uncertainty that often surrounds new 
rules.262  This often leads to three types of costs:  learning, uncertainty, and 
development.263  Learning costs are the costs that are required in having 
judges, lawyers, firms, and other individuals educate themselves on the new 
rule.264  Uncertainty costs are those incurred because of the doubt around the 
new rule.  These costs may include taking action to fill in the gaps and 
ambiguities surrounding the rule or the increased legal services a firm might 
need.265  Finally, development costs are associated with a firm altering its 
business practices to adhere to the new law.266  For the solution this Note 
proposes, those costs would reflect the costs associated with adding three 
representatives.  Conducting the representatives’ elections and including 
additional information on proxy solicitations are specific examples of such.  
Other than the additional costs that rulemaking produces, companies may 
also decide to incorporate outside the United States if what the SEC 
promulgates is too burdensome.267  However, this threat seems hollow.  
Ultimately, the U.S. has one of the best equipped legal systems to handle 
corporate law issues.268  Companies value having a trustworthy and 
predictable legal system.  Despite the issues that come with SEC rule 
promulgation, having the agency implement the solution makes the most 
sense. 
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B.  The Observing Board 
This Note proposes the SEC promulgate a new rule to help curb the 
shareholder primacy norm and, in turn, spur long-term business strategies 
from the board of directors.  Specifically, the rule should require corporations 
of a certain size to add a three-person observing board.  By mandating large 
corporations to have a three-person observing board, firms will feel pressured 
to consider all stakeholder groups, not only shareholders.  This observing 
board will consist of one employee representative, one creditor 
representative, and one minority shareholder representative.  Part III.B.1 will 
detail these positions and the rationale behind having representatives for 
these specific constituencies.  Part III.B.2 will then examine the powers of 
this observer board, which bear some resemblance to the powers of the 
Aufsichtsrat in Germany.269 
1.  The Election and Composition of the Observing Board 
The observing board will contain three members:  representatives of the 
employees, creditors, and minority shareholders of the firm.  These are 
constituencies whose representations in the boardroom will have the largest 
impact for all the firm’s stakeholders.270  These board members will be 
elected in specific ways to ensure that all members of each constituency 
group have a say in their representative. 
First, the employees will elect their representative through a plurality 
voting system conducted on the company’s intranet.  Each employee, 
regardless of position within the company, will have one vote.  One vote per 
person ensures that upper management cannot plant someone more aligned 
with their interests on the board.  It also allows for the rank-and-file 
employees to have the greatest say in who represents them.  The hitch with 
this is that Delaware law does not allow employees to nominate directors.271  
Requiring disclosure from companies that do not nominate the director that 
has been suggested by the employees would provide a work-around for this 
issue.  The employees would still have their election process and nominate 
someone, and the board would then have the option of actually putting this 
person on the ballots.  If they chose not to, they would be required to disclose 
why they did not incorporate the nominee of the employees.  This would have 
a similarly coercive effect for the board of directors because the board would 
have to explain its decision to forgo employees’ nominee in its proxy 
statement. 
As for the nomination process, the employee representative will be self-
nominated.  While independence from the company may seem important, 
these concerns are largely overblown.  It is unlikely that any elected 
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employee will be so disputatious that the employee’s job is put in danger.  
There are advantages to having an actual employee as a representative, 
primarily that it is likely to help increase transparency between management 
and the workers.  The representative can immediately relay concerns and 
issues other employees are having to the board, without having to go through 
a middleman.  This should increase efficiencies and rapport between the 
groups. 
The employees’ representation on the board is essential for the observing 
board to work as intended.  Employees are interested in the long-term health 
of the firm at which they are employed.272  While critics argue that employees 
are able to contract for their employment, the reality is that most workers in 
the United States, particularly those at will, do not have the same protections 
as shareholders.273  Thus, generally, a worker’s best job protection is a 
healthy firm. 
Having employees represented on the observer board will also help in 
establishing trust and through that trust, better dissemination of information.  
It is hard to quantify the importance of trust in a firm,274 but it is clear that 
by having workers represented in board discussions, more trust will form 
between directors and officers and the rest of the firm’s employees.275  An 
increase in trust should lead to more open lines of communication between 
the directors and employees.  Directors can act faster and more efficiently in 
making decisions involving labor, factories, equipment, and the like, thus 
reducing firm transaction costs.276  Some argue that in systems with advisory 
boards, communications are chilled because directors and officers fear leaks 
and have a general lack of trust.277  However, with strict confidentiality 
agreements and enforcement of those agreements, this fear should dissipate 
and allow for the managing board to talk more openly. 
The creditor representative selection process will operate differently than 
the employee process.  First, it is important to note that the creditor 
representative will primarily represent creditors holding unsecured debt.  
These are the creditors with the lowest priority in a bankruptcy proceeding 
and are most likely to lose their investment.  Thus, they care more about the 
firm’s long-term health than other creditors.278  Choosing a representative 
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will require looking at all the unsecured debt offerings.  The trustee of the 
bank or trust company of the largest outstanding offering will serve as the 
creditor representative.279  It is worth mentioning that Delaware allows for 
corporations to give creditors the right to vote.280  However, in practice, this 
is nonexistent when the firm is solvent.281  The process outlined above is 
responsive to this reality.  Rather than allowing creditors to vote, a custom 
that seemingly no corporation has allowed for, the representative will be 
chosen based on preexisting criteria.  One potential problem with this 
approach is that the same trustee could sit on the board for decades.  
However, the rule will require that after serving a maximum of three one-
year terms, the trustee of the bank of the next largest outstanding offering 
will take over.  If the offering becomes due during a term, that trustee 
becomes ineligible.  This system ensures that the creditor representative is 
someone who has a stake in the long-term health of the firm but also 
forecloses the opportunity for corruption.  Another problem is that some 
creditors, like trade creditors, may have various conflicting interests that 
could result in a competitor receiving confidential information.  Inserting a 
trustee precludes this potential for impropriety. 
Again, like with the employee representative, the creditors have no legal 
entitlement to nominate a director.  A similar workaround like the one 
outlined above with the employee nominee could be fashioned for the 
creditor representative.  If the presumptive creditor nominee is not selected 
by the board, the board would be compelled to explain why in its proxy 
statement. 
Having a creditor representative further strengthens the long-term focus of 
the observing board.  Those holding onto unsecured debt from a firm want 
their principal returned at the end of the loan term.  While some might argue 
that creditors are already protected contractually,282 the protections are much 
weaker for holders of unsecured debt.283  They typically do not want the firm 
engaging in risky, short-term behavior that could be detrimental to the long-
term health of the firm.284 
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Even though this perspective is identical to that of the employee 
representative, there are clearly situations where their interests could diverge.  
For example, if a firm was considering issuing a new class of debt to fund 
investment in a new factory, the employee representative would likely 
approve of this as it would create more jobs, while the creditor representative 
would probably be opposed to the suggestion of creating more debt.  Thus, 
while their perspectives may be similar, there are important distinctions 
between the employee and creditor representatives that make each necessary. 
Finally, the minority shareholders will elect their representative in a 
similar manner to that of the general election process for directors.285  In 
determining who can vote on the shareholder representative, the rule will 
mirror SEC Rule 14a-8 for shareholder proposals.286  The floor requirement 
will look identical to Rule 14a-8:  to vote, one must hold $2000 worth of the 
firm’s stock continuously for at least one year.  The rule will add a ceiling of 
$100,000 for voting purposes.  This would allow only those shareholders 
who hold between $2000 and $100,000 of the company’s stock continuously 
for one year to vote for the minority shareholder representative.  A process 
like this ensures that the minority shareholder representative is someone 
whose incentives are aligned with the typical shareholder.287 
The Delaware code does allow for corporations to adopt a bylaw that 
permits individuals nominated by shareholders to be included in a proxy 
statement.288  Thus the questions that arose with employees and creditors 
electing a representative are not issues here. 
The voting process for the minority shareholder representative will be 
indistinguishable from the election process for ordinary directors.  On the 
proxy statement, below the candidates for the regular board, there will be a 
list of the nominees for the representative spot.  Under each candidate’s 
name, there will be a short summary of pertinent information.289  
Shareholders will then vote for one individual.290  The board of directors will 
not give a recommendation for any specific candidate.  This process is 
desirable because it combines feasibility, since it mirrors the method already 
in place, and accessibility, since it allows for shareholders to easily cast a 
knowledgeable vote. 
By being represented on the observing board, minority shareholders act as 
an important counterbalance to the employees and creditors, while sharing 
some similar incentives to those of the other groups.  Shareholders, regardless 
of the number of shares they hold, are going to be less risk averse than 
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employees and creditors.291  Shareholders can diversify their investments 
across a broad spectrum of companies.  This allows for a greater risk 
threshold.  If a firm investment fails, it may mean employees get laid off or 
creditors do not recoup their investments but shareholders can take the loss 
and move on.  Having a group willing to embrace risk is important for the 
observing board so as to prevent complete suppression of risk.  Risky 
investments are important for many firms to undertake.292  Additionally, the 
minority shareholder representative will still have a long-term view because 
minority shareholders tend to make long-term investments to fund, for 
example, education or retirement.293  Thus, by including minority 
shareholders, the observing board provides a perspective that appreciates 
some risk, while remaining long-term oriented. 
2.  The Powers of the Observing Board 
The powers of this board, while limited, are strong enough to change the 
decision-making of the board of directors.  Striking the right balance is 
crucial.294  If the observing board has too little power, the managing board 
will not take it seriously and no real change will occur.295  On the other hand, 
giving the observing board too much power may effect the managing board’s 
business judgment.296  Therefore, the observing board needs legitimate but 
restrained powers.  These powers will be disclosure-based since mandating 
disclosure can have a prominent effect on director decision-making,297 while 
also not providing substantive power to the observers.  This disclosure 
solution is also desirable as it is not a radical upheaval of current law. 
One of the most basic powers of the observers is their quorum power.  For 
the managing board of directors to establish a quorum, at least two observers 
must be present.  This will safeguard against the managing board meeting 
without all members of the observing board present.  It will also increase 
transparency between the two boards, something that is essential for crafting 
effective disclosure.298  Most importantly, since observers will be required to 
submit various disclosures, as discussed below, they must be present to 
monitor board meetings.  Ideally these observers will also participate in board 
meetings, particularly by bringing up issues raised by their respective groups.  
This will likely be most useful for the employees because their day-to-day is 
affected by many of the board’s decisions.  The goal of this approach is also 
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to increase transparency within the firm.  By having a direct line of 
communication to the managing board of directors, it is reasonable to assume 
the firm will become more efficient.299 
The primary power of the observers is their authority and obligation to 
submit various disclosure documents.  This power is indispensable for 
shifting the board of directors’ focus from purely the shareholder.  The first 
required disclosure that each observer must make will be in a proxy 
statement.  This can easily be implemented by amending the requirements 
for Schedule 14A, which dictates the information required in a proxy 
statement.300  Each observer will draft a summary discussing business and 
compensation highlights and the observer’s stance on those decisions.  These 
summaries will be on the first page of the proxy statement, immediately 
following the table of contents.  Then, for each proposal, including the 
election of directors, each observer will disclose the observor’s stance and 
provide a brief summary of its potential impact on its constituency group.  
This will include both management and shareholder proposals governed by 
Rule 14a-8.  So, when the board of directors nominates individuals for board 
spots, each observer would disclose a position on the candidate and whether 
they recommend voting for or against each candidate.  Likewise, if 
management proposed issuing additional stock, each observer would briefly 
comment on the potential impact of the decision on the relevant constituency 
and whether they recommend voting for or against the proposal. 
These disclosures and recommendations from the observers serve 
important purposes.  First, they give shareholders more perspectives to 
consider when voting on proposals.  Typically, a shareholder gets a 
recommendation exclusively from the board of directors that is inherently 
one-sided.301  Allowing the observers to disclose their constituencies’ views 
should reduce costs by providing the principal (the shareholder) with better 
information regarding the proposed activities of the agent.302  These 
disclosure measures should also lead to the board of directors focusing more 
on other stakeholders.  If the firm proposes engaging in a short-term activity, 
like a share repurchase plan, those shareholders seeking long-term value can 
read the thoughts of the observers and may decide to sell their shares and 
invest elsewhere.  Thus, it is likely that the Schedule 14A disclosures from 
the observers will reduce agency costs while also pushing the board of 
directors to consider all stakeholders. 
Each observer will also make a year-end disclosure as part of the 
company’s 10-K submission, a corporation’s annual report that summarizes 
the company’s financial performance.  In this disclosure, the representative 
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will provide:  (1) the potential risks facing its constituency group in the 
upcoming fiscal year; (2) the major transactions of the past fiscal year and 
how each has, and will continue to, impact the specific group; and (3) an 
outlook of the upcoming fiscal year specific to the representative’s 
constituency.  These disclosures will serve a similar purpose to those in the 
proxy statement.  While the minority shareholder disclosure will heavily 
mirror the regular 10-K submission, the creditor and employee report will 
provide a clearer picture of the potential risks, along with commentary on the 
firm’s decisions.  This again provides more well-rounded insight into the 
health of the firm.  Ideally it will also make the board of directors more wary 
of undertaking actions that directly harm other stakeholder groups.  If it does, 
its decision will be reflected in the year-end report and cannot be concealed.  
This will force directors to think harder before engaging in a short-term 
action.  Having a year-end report from each representative that outlines 
forward-looking risks and expectations will create more robust disclosures 
that investors can use.  The hope is that directors, cognizant of this, will 
conduct greater deliberations before undertaking an action that exclusively 
benefits the shareholder, allowing them to at least consider the other 
stakeholders. 
The observers will have various other powers, like the ability to access the 
firm’s financial records and to suggest a course of action for major decisions.  
Allowing the observers to access the firm’s records reinforces the goal of 
increased transparency and gives the representatives more information on 
which to base their disclosures.  While some believe that giving nondirectors 
or managers access to sensitive records may lead to leaks,303 this fear is 
probably overblown.  Even so, to protect against the potential divulgence of 
confidential, sensitive information, each representative would sign a number 
of confidentiality agreements.  Another power for the observers is letting the 
representatives suggest a course of action for major firm decisions, 
something similar to the disclosures they make in Schedule 14A filings.  
However, it varies in the fact that the representative can suggest a specific 
plan and, if that plan is not adopted, the board of directors must explain why.  
This rule would adopt a number of the elements of Rule 14a-8 regarding 
shareholder proposals.304  This power allows for shareholders to get a fuller 
disclosure of the potential issues with a board’s course of action before 
initiating the action.  This enables shareholders to be better informed of the 
potential risks and arguments against the proposed action.  Likewise, this 
disclosure will allow for a more accurate reflection of share price.  These two 
powers will reinforce the importance of transparency and disclosure of other 
long-term stakeholder perspectives.  The goal is that the board of directors 
will consider the positions of nonshareholders when making decisions.  If 
they do not, it will be disclosed and share price will likely decline.  These 
powers, while not substantive, have enough bite to affect real change. 
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CONCLUSION 
The public’s frustration with corporate America has begun to boil over, as 
reflected in the statements of politicians and corporate executives.  The 
shareholder primacy norm and its often negative consequences must slowly 
be dismantled so that corporations can also consider other firm stakeholders.  
Doing so will help reduce the influence of powerful institutional investors, 
while allowing firms to focus more on long-term profits.  An advantageous 
way to achieve this is through an SEC rule that creates positions for three 
board observers representing different constituency groups.  Having an 
employee, minority shareholder, and creditor representative come together 
to form an observing board will create more varied disclosure and will 
provide stakeholders with a more forceful voice, compelling the board of 
directors to take them into account. 
